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Sentencing guidelines
and prosecutorial discretion
Guidelines have generally increased prosecutorial discretion.
This may be exactly what legislators, who see
prosecutors as their allies, intended.
by David Boerner
N.P rominent among the attacks
on sentencing guidelines is
the charge that they have
greatly increased prosecuto-
rial power. "[I]n reality," writes one
critic, "the guidelines are bargaining
weapons-armaments that enable
, '. prosecutors, not the sentencing com-
,; .. mission, to determine the sentence in
DAVID BOERNER is an associate profes-
sor at Seattle University School of Law.
most cases."' There is truth in this, but
like all polemics its broad brush ob-
scures the fact that just as all guide-
lines are not equal, their effect on
prosecutorial discretion is neither
equal nor equally bad.
Sentencing reform over the past
two decades has significantly
changed the allocation of discretion
in sentencing. Revoking a long-
standing delegation, legislatures in.
many jursdictions have reasserted
their poli -making primacy. Not sur-
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risingly, both the structure and the
details of these reforms vary widely.
They are, after all, local resolutions
of complex issues, each produced in
its own political environment. While
their range is wide, these reforms
share two common characteristics.
First, they have significantly circum-
scribed judicial discretion in sentenc-
ing and, in many cases, have abolished
the release discretion of parole au-
thorities. Second, by increasing the
importance of the defendant's crimi-
nal behavior and decreasing the im-
portance of the defendant's personal
characteristics, they increase the im-
portance of the crime of conviction in
determining the sentence. This shifts
the balance between prosecutors and
defendants, since much that can be
said in the defendant's favor is no
longer relevant, while the crime-
related information prosecutors con-
trol retains its relevancy.
Increasing the importance of the
defendant's criminal conduct in deter-
mining the ultimate sentence un-
doubtedly increases the power of pros-
ecutors. Prosecutors have discretion
over the nature and number of
charges to be filed and whether those
charges are to be amended or reduced
before conviction. This, of course, is
not new.Justice RobertJackson's state-
ment that "[t] he prosecutor has more
control over life, liberty and reputa-
tion than any other person in Amer-
ica" 2 was as true when he said it more
than a half century ago as it is today.
What has changed is the relative
power of the prosecutor. To use
Holmes' dragon metaphor,3 in juris-
dictions that have adopted sentencing
guidelines, three dragons of discretion
have been dragged onto the plain.
/, .. .
1. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A
Plea For Less Aggregation, 58 U.CH. L. Riv. 901, 926
(1991).
2. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOcY3 (1940).
3. Holmes, THE PATH OF THE LAW, COLLECTED LE-
GAL PAPERS, 167, 187 (1920).
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One (release discretion of parole
boards) has been killed and one (judi-
cial sentencing discretion) has been
significantly constrained. The re-
maining dragon (prosecutorial discre-
tion), however, continues to roam the
plain unrestrained.
Shifts in discretion
These shifts in discretion were not a
surprise. The legislatures that created
these reforms and the commissions
that implemented them were aware of
what they were doing. Commentators
had warned that guidelines would "in-
crease the powers of prosecutors"' and
"impair the tempering role... exer-
cised by the judiciary."5 Thus, guide-
lines would "risk relocating discretion
in ways that are unintended and possi-
bly perversely counterproductive." 6
The few existing empirical studies all
confirm, to no one's surprise, that
prosecutors continue to exercise their
discretion under sentencing guide-
lines.7 Yet in only two jurisdictions, the
United States and the State of Wash-
ington, was the issue of prosecutorial
discretion explicitly addressed. Why?
The answer may lie in our understand-
ing of the nature of prosecutorial dis-
cretion and in the reasons for sentenc-
ing reform.
First, there is the widely shared view
that enforcement discretion cannot be
externally regulated. As Kenneth Culp
Davis, the most astute student of dis-
cretion, put it a quarter century ago,
[the] universally accepted assumptions...
are that the prosecuting power must, of
course, be discretionary, that statutory
provisions as to what enforcement officers
'shall' do may be freely violated without
disapproval from the public or from other
officials, that determinations to prosecute
or not to prosecute may be made secretly
without any statement of findings or rea-
sons, that such decisions by a top pros-
ecutor... usually need not be reviewable by
any other administrative authority, and
that decisions to prosecute or not to pros-
ecute are not judicially reviewable for
abuse of discretion."
8
There is little evidence that these as-
sumptions have changed.
The second reason for continued
prosecutorial discretion is that legisla-
tors see prosecutors as their allies in
achieving the substantive ends reforms
are designed to produce. They thus
see prosecutorial discretion as less in
need of constraint. Whether or not
this perception is accurate, it influ-
enced legislators as they created and
modified their guidelines. Sentencing
guidelines are reforms, produced by
dissatisfaction with existing sentencing
practices and a desire to change those
practices. The reforms are pragmatic,
concerned more with results than
form, more with the consequences of
shifts in power than the location of
that power. Thus, for many reformers
the claim that prosecutorial power has
increased and the power of others de-
creased is beside the point. What is
important is whether the shifts in
power produced the intended results.
Taming the dragon
Examining the two guidelines systems
that have addressed prosecutorial dis-
cretion provides insights into both the
validity of this thesis and the influence
of those attempts. Their differences
and the different effects they have may
indicate whether the dragon of pros-
ecutorial discretion can be tamed, or
at least made more useful.
First, however, the issue of statuto-
rily mandated sentences must be ad-
dressed. Where legislatures accom-
pany guidelines with mandatory
sentencing provisions, as Congress
has, then the offense conviction dic-
tates the sentence, and those who de-
termine what that offense will be have
absolute power over the sentence. The
issue is whether this was intended. In
all probability, Congress was quite
aware of how mandatory sentences
would enhance prosecutorial power
and intended precisely that result.
Nothing inherent in sentencing
guidelines requires mandatory sen-
4. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial
Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for 'Fixed" and
"Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PENN. L. REv. 550,
577 (1978).
5. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U.
PENN. L.REV. 733, 755 (1980).
6. Tonry and Coffee Jr., Hard Choices: Critical
Trade-Offs in The Implementation of Sentencing Reform
Through Guidelines, in Tonry and Zimring, eds., RE-
FORM AND PUNISHMENT, 155, 159 (1983).
7. See Nagel and Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities:
An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Prac-
tices Under The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
CAL. L.REv. 501 (1992); Tonry, Structuring Sentenc-
ing, 10 CRIME ANDJUST. 267, 311-315 (1988).
8. Davis, DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY IN-
QUIRY, 188-189 (1969).
9. See Tonry, Mandatory Penalties, 16 CRIME AND
JUST. 243 (1992).
tences, which are fundamentally at
odds with the idea that guidelines
should structure but not eliminate ju-
dicial sentencing discretion. All of the
state guidelines systems are presump-
tive, not mandatory, and they repre-
sent a rejection of mandatory sen-
tences as unwise and ineffective.9 In
the state of Washington, for example,
when the legislature adopted sentenc-
ing guidelines, it prospectively re-
pealed provisions requiring manda-
tory minimum sentences for all crimes
involving deadly weapons and for ha-
bitual criminals. This reduced the
power prosecutors had to influence
the ultimate sentence. In this context,
at least, they lost, not gained, power
when guidelines replaced the former
regime.10 However, the fact that most
commentators see Washington's judg-
ment as wiser than that of Congress is
irrelevant to the effect of presumptive
sentencing guidelines on prosecuto-
rial discretion.
Washington's guidelines addressed
the issue of prosecutorial discretion.
They included detailed "Standards
For Charging and Plea Dispositions""]
but prefaced them with the statement:
"These standards are intended solely
for the guidance of prosecutors in the
state of Washington. They are not in-
tended to, do not and may not be re-
lied upon to create right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable
at law by a party in litigation with the
state."12 Not surprisingly, the courts
have honored this injunction,"S and
the standards have had no noticeable
effect on prosecutorial discretion. 4
Washington's guidelines also estab-
lished a mechanism for judicial review
of plea bargains. They require disclo-
sure of "the nature of the agreement
10. In 1992, Washington's voters, exercising the
power of initiative, enacted w'ith a 76 percent affir-
mative vote a "three strikes and you're out"
amendment to the sentencing guidelines that re-
quires a mandatory life sentence upon the third
conviction of a violent felony. Washington's legisla-
ture considered but failed to enact a similar provi-
sion in the 1992 legislative session.
11. RCW 9.94A.430-.460.
12. RCW 9.94A.430.
13. See State v. Lee, 69 Wash. App. 31, 847 P.2d
25 (1993).
14. A number of Washington's prosecutors have
adopted internal policies that structure the charg-
ing and bargaining discretion their deputies exer-
cise. There are indications that these policies have
been effective within those offices, but that issue is
beyond the scope of this article.
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and the reasons for the agreement"
and provide that the judge "shall de-
termine if the agreement is consistent
with the interests of justice and with
the prosecuting standards." If not, the
court shall inform the parties "that
they are not bound by the agreement
and that the defendant may withdraw
the.. .plea of guilty.. .and enter a plea
of not guilty."' 5 In addition, existing
law gave judges the "clear discretion-
ary authority to refuse to accept a plea
bargain" including "the
right to refuse or allow the




While no formal studies
have been conducted,
there are no indications
these provisions have had
any effect. The reasons are tl
probably institutional.
Judges share Davis's as-
sumptions and doubt their
ability to evaluate the rea-
sons the parties offer. They
also conceive of their role
as passive, responding to issues pre-
sented in an adversarial manner by the
parties appearing before them. Once a
plea agreement has been reached, the
adversary system ceases to operate.
Both the prosecutor and the defense
attorney want the plea agreement to
be implemented, and neither will ar-
gue that the plea agreement is not
"consistent with the interest ofjus-
tice" or "the prosecuting standards."
The obvious beneficial effect of a
guilty plea on the judge's docket also
presents a significant incentive against
rejection of the plea agreement. Per-
haps we should not be surprised that
Washington's judges have not exer-
cised the authority the legislature gave
them. At the same time, there is little
reason to believe that authorizing
judges to review prosecutorial discre-
tion will have significant systematic ef-
fects.
The federal guidelines took a more
oblique approach. Expressing the fear
15. RCW 9.94A.090(1).
16. State v. Haner, 95 Wn.2d 858, 861, 631 P.2d
381 (1981).
17. See Wilkins Jr. and Steer, Relevant Conduct:
The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41
S. C. L. REv. 495 (1990).
18. Freed, Federal Sentencing In The Wake of Guide-
lines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentences,
101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1714 (1992).
that a conviction-based system would
enhance prosecutorial power inappro-
priately, they are based on the defen-
dants' "relevant conduct,"" what
judges determine the defendant actu-
ally did rather than what he or she has
been convicted of. All states based
their guidelines on the conviction of-
fense. The major reason for the deci-
sion in Washington, and probably in
the other states, was the question of
basic fairness. It was seen as wrong to
Legislators see prosecutors
as their allies in achieving
ie substantive ends reforn
are designed to produce.
sentence a person for crimes the pros-
ecutor either could not or chose not to
prove. At the same time, the legisla-
ture was aware that existing practices
frequently resulted in convictions of
offenses that did not accurately reflect
what the defendant had actually done.
They believed that a conviction-based
system was more likely than a real of-
fense system to achieve the twin goals
of fairness and accuracy. These differ-
ing approaches present an opportu-
nity for comparison.
A conviction-based system
It is safe to say that from the legisla-
ture's perspective an ideal result is for
every defendant to be convicted and
sentenced for what he or she has done,
no more and no less. A legislature
seeking this goal is likely to look past
whose discretion is enhanced and
whose is curbed and concentrate on
what would most effectively achieve its
goal. A conviction-based system in-
creases prosecutorial accountability
for their charging and bargaining de-
cisions. Under a real-offense system,
which existed in the states before
guidelines, prosecutors were able to
offer defendants what were in effect il-
lusory bargains. An offer of the dis-
missal or reduction of charges, while
apparently benefiting the defendant,
in fact cost the prosecution nothing
since judges could, and did, sentence
defendants for what they actually did.
In addition to denying defendants the
benefit of their bargain, this practice
had the effect of misrepresenting a
defendant's criminal history. Prosecu-
tors were spared public accountability
for these offers of dismissals or reduc-
tions because they could accurately
state that sentencing
judges could impose sen-
tences based on what the
defendant actually did. If
judges failed to do so, it
was their fault and not the
prosecution's. Prosecutors
could employ their discre-
18 tion to effectively manage
their workload and to
achieve a variety of other
goals without accountabil-
ity for the consequences.
As Daniel Freed has
pointed out, when the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines retained
this system they allowed prosecutors to
continue to exercise the uncon-
strained power it permits. 8
The incentives in a conviction of-
fense-based system run in the opposite
direction. Prosecutorial decisions have
real consequences, and prosecutors
are responsible for those conse-
quences. Crimes that prosecutors
could not or chose not to prove cannot
influence sentences. This creates in-
centives for accurate charging deci-
sions and against charge reductions,
incentives that are particularly salient
to elected prosecutors. A legislature
concerned with accurate convictions is
thus more likely to achieve that result
with a conviction-based system than
with a real-offense system.
Excessive severity
While a conviction-based system does
create incentives against excessive le-
niency, the fact that it contributes to
an increase in relative prosecutorial
power arguably offers the opportunity
for excessive severity. This presents a
definitional issue-what constitutes
excessive severity? Here there is funda-
mental disagreement. Most commen-
tators see the sentences produced by
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current sentencing guidelines, both
federal and state, as excessively severe
from the standpoint of any penologi-
cal purpose. Legislators and the public
do not. Legislators seek accuracy; they
do not believe it unjust to convict
people of the crimes-all the crimes-
they have committed. In their eyes,jus-
tice is served when defendants are
convicted of these crimes and receive
sentences they deem appropriate.
From this perspective, excessive se-
verity occurs only when the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion results in sen-
tences longer than intended by the
legislature. This can occur in multiple
ways; together they present what
Stephen Breyer called the "intractable
sentencing problem."' 9 First, the na-
ture of criminal codes is such that it is
possible to split one criminal episode
into a number of crimes. The resulting
problem of multiplicity of charges is
not new and has been seen as an issue
resolved by determining what the
legislature's intent was.20 Guidelines
accentuate this problem because they
translate multiple convictions into in-
creased presumptive sentences.
Second, there is the widely shared
perception that while multiple related
crimes are more serious than single
crimes, the increase in punishment
should not be directly proportionate.
It is difficult to discern a principle that
requires what can be seen as a volume
discount, but this perception is widely
shared. Determining what the appro-
priate increase should be is no simple
task. Here again the problem is not
new. All guidelines reject the former
solution of leaving the issue of whether
to make some or all of the sentences
run consecutively or concurrently to
the sentencing judge's discretion.
Their solutions vary, but all enhance
the power of prosecutors because the
presumptive sentence increases with
the number of convictions. None,
however, grant prosecutors the broad
discretion judges formerly exercised.
Third is the problem of manufac-
tured sentences. While ordinarily the
decision as to how many crimes to
commit is the defendant's, there are
situations where enforcement tech-
niques are the effective determiners.
For example, when someone sells
drugs to an undercover law enforce-
ment officer, the number of sales is or-
dinarily limited only by the officers'
persistence. The knowledge that in-
creasing the number of sales will result
in increased sentences provides the
incentive to continue making buys un-
til a sentence is achieved that the of-
ficer, or the prosecutor directing the
investigation, believes appropriate.
This is not a theoretical possibility. In
Washington, where the solution to the
multiple offense issue is to treat all
current convictions after the first as if
they were prior offenses, a number of
prosecutors have express policies that
encourage law enforcement to make
the number of buys from "major deal-
ers" necessary to obtain the maximum
presumptive sentences available under
the guidelines. 21 One would have to be
exceptionally naive not to suspect that
this possibility has not occurred to po-
lice and prosecutors in other guide-
lines jurisdictions. The same possi-
bilities exist where the guidelines
make sentences turn on the quantity
of drugs involved 22 or the location of
the transaction.
An antidote
Here judicial review can provide an
antidote. Washington's guidelines per-
mit judges to depart from the pre-
sumptive sentence ranges for a num-
ber of reasons, including in situations
where "[t]he operation of the mul-
tiple offense policy... results in a pre-
sumptive sentence that is clearly exces-
sive" or "clearly too lenient.
' 23
Appellate courts have approved miti-
gated exceptional sentences based on
this provision to counter enforcement
discretion that enhanced the pre-
sumptive sentence. 24 This is an ex-
ample of how guidelines can simulta-
neously constrain judicial discretion
while employing it to respond to the
consequences of the shift in dis-
19. Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 25 (1988).
20. See e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386,
389 (1957) ("Whatever views may be entertained
regarding severity of punishment, whether one be-
lieves in its efficacy or its futility,.. .these are pecu-
liarly questions of legislative policy.")
21. See e.g., State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 305,
797 P.2d 1141 (1990).
22. See e.g. U.S. v. Rosen, 929 F.2d 839 (lst Cir.),
cert. denied 112 S.Ct 77 (1991) (defendant negoti-
ated and paid for 30 pounds of marijuana, federal
agents loaded his car with 150 pounds, sentence
cretionary power that accompanies
that constraint. The decision to do so,
however, is the legislature's. All legisla-
tive bodies do not see the issue the
same way.
Congress and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission address the related issue
of a prosecutor's perceived need to re-
ward defendants who provide informa-
tion or other assistance from a differ-
ent perspective. Congress has
authorized, and the commission has
implemented, a system in which the
determination of whether a "substan-
tial assistance" discount is to be
granted is left solely in the unreviewed
discretion of the prosecutor.25 Its effect
is to give to the prosecutor the sole key
to leniency. It was the judgment of
Congress and the commission, not
anything inherent in the nature of sen-
tencing guidelines, that enhanced this
aspect of prosecutorial power. They
saw the usefulness of prosecutorial dis-
cretion as being furthered by increas-
ing its power, not taming it. No state
has seen the issue the same way.
This brings us back to where we be-
gan. Sentencing guidelines are among
the tools legislatures can use to influ-
ence, if not completely tame, the drag-
ons of discretion in the criminal justice
system. How those tools will be used
depends on the values of our legisla-
tures. Sentencing guidelines did not
create those values, and they cannot
transcend them. How effective the
tools will be depends on the values and
the skill of those who design and em-
ploy them. V1
based on 150 pounds was affirmed).
23. RCW 9.94A.390(1).
24. State v. Sanchez, 69 Wn. App. 255, 261
(1993) ("...the difference between the first buy,
viewed alone, and all three buys were initiated and
controlled by the police. All three involved the
same buyer, the same seller and no one else. All
three occurred inside a residence within a nine-day
span of time. All three involved small amounts of
drugs. The second and third buys had no apparent
purpose other than to increase Sanchez's pre-
sumptive sentence."
25. See supran. 18, at 1710-1712.
200 Judicature Volume 78, Number 4 January-February 1995






They honor, preserve and distinguish
offering a link to the past,
a hope for the future.
American Arbitration Assocation
At the core is an enduring ideal
synonymous with resolution. Yet, our
complete identity is built on a wider-reaching
range of services which includes administration
of mediation, mini-trials and other voluntary
means of dispute settlement, as well as the
provision of expert neutrals, education
and training.
Respect for the past.
Confidence for the future.
AAA
Dispute Resolution Services
140 West 51 st Street
New York, NY 10020-1203
(212) 484-4040 FAX (212) 765-4874
January-February 1995 Volume 78, Number 4 Judicature 201
HeinOnline  -- 78 Judicature 201 1994-1995
